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Introduction
According to dozens of high profile books and reports published in recent 
years, we are virtually certain to see a terrorist attack using a weapon of 
mass destruction (WMD) at some point in our lifetime.1 Some observers 
have argued that the primary objective of terrorist groups is to kill as 
many people as they possibly can, and thus we should expect them to pur-
sue and use WMD. However, this line of reasoning is ill-informed; there is 
much more to terrorism than simply intent to kill. Meanwhile, others 
have suggested that trends among weak states and the globalization of 
crime and terrorist networks are combining to yield a higher probability 
of WMD terrorism (dubbed "threat convergence" by some).2 Essentially, 
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This article examines theories of practical and strategic constraints that 
collectively explain why so few terrorist groups in history have crossed (or 
attempted to cross) the WMD threshold. From this analysis, it becomes 
clear that a terrorist group's deliberations about WMD can be influenced 
(positively or negatively) by a variety of factors. Our projections of the 
future WMD terrorism threat must therefore account for changes in the 
kinds of practical and strategic constraints that could lead to an increased 
willingness and/or capability of a group to pursue these kinds of weapons. 
Further, there are ways in which governments can influence a terrorist 
group's decision-making and thus have a direct impact on the future evo-
lution of the WMD terrorism threat.
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the suggestion is made that increased access to WMD materials will lead 
to more WMD terrorist attacks, taking for granted that terrorist groups 
intend to acquire and use them.
However, of the hundreds of terrorist groups that have existed over the 
past century, only a handful have used (or tried to use) any kind of WMD. 
Furthermore, we know of only a small number of terrorist groups in exist-
ence today that have publicly declared an interest in acquiring and using 
WMD. What accounts for this noticeable contrast between dire predic-
tions of the threat and the historical record on WMD terrorism? Indeed, 
why have so few terrorist groups overall shown an interest in WMD? After 
a brief historical review of terrorist-related WMD events, this article will 
explore two categories of theoretical constraints (practical and strategic) 
that collectively help explain why so few terrorist groups have crossed the 
WMD threshold. The analysis will then conclude with implications for 
further research and policy development.
WMD Terrorist Attacks and Plots: 
Historical Examples
As noted above, there are only a small handful of terrorist attacks or plots 
to date involving some form of WMD, and most of these are quite familiar 
to students and scholars in the terrorism studies field.3 For example:
•   In the autumn of 1984, a cult led by the Bhagwan Shri Rajneesh used 
Salmonella Typhimurium—a bacterium that normally causes non-fatal 
food poisoning—to contaminate several restaurant salad bars in a plot 
to influence a local election in Oregon.4 
•   In 1985, a small survivalist group in the Ozark Mountains of Arkansas 
known as the Covenant, the Sword, and the Arm of the Lord acquired 
approximately 30 gallons of potassium cyanide, with the intention of 
poisoning water supplies in New York, Chicago, and Washington, D.C.5
•   In June 1990, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) used chlo-
rine gas in an assault on a Sri Lankan Armed Forces camp at East 
Kiran, injuring 60 soldiers.6
•   In March 1995, Aum Shinrikyo—a Japanese religious cult—launched 
an attack on the Tokyo subway using sarin gas, killing nearly a dozen 
people and injuring thousands more.7
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•   Later that year, Chechen rebels planted—but did not detonate—a radio-
logical dispersion device (RDD, also known as a "dirty bomb") consist-
ing of dynamite and cesium 137 in a pedestrian park in Moscow.
•   In October 2001, an unknown assailant mailed letters in the U.S. 
stuffed with weaponized anthrax, killing five and sickening dozens 
more.8
•   In January 2003, British police raided an apartment in north London 
and found recipes and instructions in Arabic for making ricin as well as 
other toxins, along with tools which appeared to contain chemical resi-
due, castor beans (the raw ingredient needed to produce ricin), cherry 
and apple seeds (which are used in the production of cyanide), and a 
CD-ROM containing instructions for making homemade explosives.9
•   In January 2004, U.S. military forces discovered seven pounds of cya-
nide salt during a raid on a Baghdad house that was reportedly con-
nected with al Qaida, and in November of that year they discovered a 
"chemical laboratory" in Fallujah containing potassium cyanide, hydro-
chloric acid, and sulfuric acid among other deadly materials.10
•   In April 2004, Jordanian authorities announced that they had broken 
up an al Qaida plot to use large quantities of toxic chemicals—including 
sulfuric acid, cyanide and insecticides—in attacks against the U.S. 
Embassy, the Jordanian prime minister's office, and the headquarters 
of Jordanian intelligence.11
•   In late 2005, a manual for the production of al-Mubtakkar, a crude 
hydrogen cyanide dispersal device, began appearing on numerous al-
Qaida websites and forums, though to date no such device has been dis-
covered by authorities.12
•   In November 2006, an alleged al-Qaida operative known as Dhiren 
Barot was convicted in the UK of planning to use a radiological weapon 
in a series of attacks on both public gathering places and key economic 
targets in both Britain and the U.S.13
•   And in December 2008, authorities in the small town of Belfast, Maine 
discovered a "dirty bomb" plot involving a well-funded right-wing 
extremist named James Cummings.14
In sum, while there is an extensive history of terrorist attacks over the 
past 50 years, only a fraction of them have involved any kind of chemical, 
biological, radiological or nuclear (CBRN) materials. Furthermore, as 
John Parachini observed, even the rare incidents that involved the use of 
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these kinds of weapons hardly threatened mass destruction.15 Scholars of 
terrorism and security studies have offered various reasons for the rela-
tive scarcity of WMD terrorist attacks, which generally fall within one of 
two categories: practical constraint theories, and strategic constraint the-
ories. Each of these categories has its merits; however, as described later 
in this essay, viewing them collectively enlightens our understanding as to 
why so few terrorist groups have ventured down the WMD path.
Practical Constraint Theories
The first category of theories basically argues that a terrorist group's 
capabilities are significantly constrained by a number of factors, and these 
constraints impact their views and decisions about CBRN weapons. There 
are generally two kinds of practical considerations: technical and 
environmental.
Technical Constraints
Theories of technical constraints are drawn from the complex nature of 
the weapons; essentially, CBRN weapons are complicated and difficult to 
build, transport, and successfully deploy against a specified target. These 
complications, in turn, diminish the terrorist group's likelihood of suc-
cessfully carrying out their attack. In other words, as Figure 1 illustrates, 
more complicated terrorist plots have lower chances of success, and this 
influences a terrorist group's choices about the type of weapons they 
would use in their attacks. Furthermore, increased technological com-
plexity of a weapon usually increases its financial costs, another key con-
sideration for terrorist groups.
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Figure 1: Constraints of Technical Complexity
Source: Author
When a terrorist group devotes its time, money and resources toward an 
attack, they will naturally want to maximize the likelihood of their opera-
tion's success. However, terrorist groups are limited by what their mem-
bers are capable of accomplishing. For instance, most terrorist groups 
have encountered significant difficulty attracting competent bio-chemists, 
physicists, radiological technicians or nuclear engineers capable of devel-
oping these types of weapons. Properly handling and storing hazardous 
chemicals, biological pathogens, or radioactive materials is also danger-
ous and requires sophisticated knowledge and skill. At the most extreme 
end of the CBRN spectrum, there are no current terrorist groups with the 
kind of advanced technical expertise needed to build and deploy a nuclear 
weapon. As noted below, it is instructive that the historical record con-
tains only one group (Aum Shinrikyo) that had the means, capabilities, 
intentions and finances to develop and deploy a sophisticated weapon of 
mass destruction. And even for them, a nuclear weapon was far beyond 
their reach.
If an extremist group does manage to overcome the significant technical 
challenges attributed to building a viable CBRN weapon, the group may 
still be unable to test the weapon in order to determine its effectiveness. 
Again, this raises a level of uncertainty into operational planners con-
cerned with minimizing the possibility that their attack will fail. In a 
sense, terrorist groups are somewhat risk-averse; their fear of failure can 
be a constraining factor in their decision-making. Another factor con-
straining these groups involves the various challenges of delivering a 
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CBRN weapon to its target safely and effectively. For example, many of 
these types of weapons are relatively fragile and can expose the group's 
members to enormous risks when transporting the device. Overall, there 
are many kinds of technical challenges associated with CBRN weapons. 
These challenges, in turn, influence a terrorist group's decision-making 
about whether to invest resources in trying to develop or acquire them for 
use.
Environmental Constraints
Other kinds of practical considerations are a product of the terrorist 
group's operating environment. From this aspect, theorists argue that a 
WMD attack is difficult as there are limited numbers of sources for CBRN 
weapons. Those who possess them, more importantly, are reluctant to 
share them with anyone else, let alone terrorists. Furthermore, the mate-
rials and technology necessary to develop CBRN weapons are difficult to 
acquire, and often prohibitively expensive. Interestingly, the financial 
aspects are sometimes overlooked by analysts, but apart from some 
industrial chemicals that are relatively ubiquitous and cheap, procuring 
the materials needed for most kinds of WMD can be expensive.
CBRN materials and technologies are also difficult to steal or purchase, as 
the international community over the past two decades has placed an 
emphasis on monitoring and restricting the commercial sale and trans-
portation of these materials and technologies, particularly across borders. 
For instance, new sensor technologies have decreased a group's ability to 
transport CBRN materials (and weapons) from one location to another, 
particularly across borders. Furthermore, if a WMD terror attack 
occurred somewhere in the world tomorrow, it is highly likely that the 
international community would respond with even greater restrictions on 
access and movement of these types of materials and technologies. Con-
versely, a foreign terrorist group may attempt to acquire CBRN materials 
within their target country, in order to assemble the weapon within that 
country and avoid the border control challenges. However, this approach 
would bring a number of different logistical and tactical challenges 
related to operating in an unfamiliar environment, again raising levels of 
uncertainty about the potential success of an attack plan.
Local conditions within a particular country are particularly important in 
regards to a terrorist group's access to CBRN materials and technologies 
required for a WMD effort. For example, Aum Shinrikyo—the only group 
known to have developed its own advanced chemical weapons program—
was allowed by Japanese government and society to hide behind a shroud 
of religious protections and a seemingly legitimate industrial chemical 
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business. Key lessons from that attack have been learned, and thus we are 
unlikely to ever see that combination of extremist ideologies and technical 
capabilities again.
Of course, the severity of these practical constraints—both technical and 
environmental—differs according to the specific type of CBRN weapon. 
For instance, the odds would be more favorable for a terrorist group 
somewhere to acquire or develop at least a rudimentary chemical weapon 
using commonly available industrial chemicals like phosgene, chlorine, 
hydrogen cyanide, or concentrated pesticides. Even some ordinary house-
hold chemicals could feasibly be used to construct low-grade but effective 
chemical weapons.
From this perspective, it is worrisome that within the past few decades we 
have seen a global proliferation of private firms developing and profiting 
from various kinds of CBRN materials and technologies. Still, as noted 
earlier, there have been only a handful of terrorist incidents involving 
CBRN weapons of any kind over the past half century. In other words, 
even the increasing availability of potential WMD components—
essentially, reducing the practical constraints—has not contributed 
meaningfully toward a rise in WMD terrorist attacks or plots. Thus, other 
types of constraints must also be influencing a terrorist group's 
deliberations about these kinds of weapons.
Strategic Constraint Theories
The second category of constraint theories argues that terrorist groups are 
largely strategic and rational, and therefore their deliberations about 
CBRN weapons involve various strategic calculations, like cost benefit 
analyses. For example, a terrorist group's leaders may ask themselves, 
"Will a CBRN weapon help us achieve our objectives faster or more 
effectively than other means? Will the possession or use of such a weapon 
bring us a considerable amount of prestige and/or power to intimidate 
our enemies?" For most terrorist groups, their strategic deliberations 
have steered them away from CBRN weapons. In fact, many scholars have 
observed that there are very few strategic benefits a terrorist group could 
derive from using a CBRN weapon, particularly compared to other, more 
conventional kinds of weapons. Furthermore, even if a group believes 
there may be some strategic benefit from a CBRN weapon, the practical 
constraint theories described earlier would still weigh heavily on their 
decision whether to actually pursue developing or acquiring such 
weapons.
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The terrorist group would additionally need to consider whether a WMD 
attack would be counterproductive by generating, for example, condem-
nation among the group's potential supporters. This possible erosion in 
support, in turn, would degrade the group's political legitimacy among its 
constituencies, who are viewed as critical to the group's long-term sur-
vival. By crossing this WMD threshold, the group could feasibly under-
mine its popular support, encouraging a perception of the group as 
deranged mass murders, rather than righteous vanguards of a movement 
or warriors fighting for a legitimate cause.16 The importance of perception 
and popular support—or at least tolerance—gives a group reason to think 
twice before crossing the threshold of catastrophic terrorism. A negative 
perception can impact a broad range of critical necessities, including 
finances, safe haven, transportation logistics, and recruitment. Many ter-
rorist groups throughout history have had to learn this lesson the hard 
way; the terrorist groups we worry about most today have learned from 
the failures and mistakes of the past, and take these into consideration in 
their strategic deliberations.
Furthermore, a WMD attack could prove counterproductive by provoking 
a government (or possibly multiple governments) to significantly expand 
their efforts to destroy the terrorist group. Following a WMD attack in a 
democracy, there would surely be a great deal of domestic pressure on 
elected leaders to respond quickly and with a massive show of force. A 
recognition of his reality is surely a constraining factor on Hezbollah 
deliberations about attacking Israel, or the Chechen's deliberations about 
attacking Russia, with such a weapon.
A group's strategic thinking about WMD is also shaped by the nature of its 
ideology. For example, the Marxist ideology of the Revolutionary Armed 
Forces of Colombia (FARC) or the Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) in 
Peru articulates a future in which they will someday be in charge of a par-
ticular governable space. This strategic vision requires them to overthrow 
an existing government while ensuring that the space and people they 
seek to influence and govern are left relatively undamaged. From this per-
spective, many types of CBRN weapons would not be useful in achieving 
this political objective. In contrast, ideologies that articulate a clear divid-
ing line between "us" and "them" allow members of a terrorist group and 
its supporters to view all of "them" (or the "others") as legitimate tar-
gets.17 This, in turn, may expand the range of weapons the group consid-
ers useful.
Victor Asal and Karl Rethemeyer highlight this point in their research on 
terrorist group lethality, using the term "othering" to describe a "process 
of clearly articulating groups and individuals that have a lesser moral or 
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ethical status than members of the terrorist organization and the racial, 
ethnic, geographic, or language group they purport to represent."18 They 
find this "othering" to be most pronounced among religious groups. In 
fact, Bruce Hoffman notes that religion "functions as a legitimizing force, 
specifically sanctioning wide-scale violence against an almost open-ended 
category of opponents."19 From this perspective, it is noteworthy that two 
of the groups that crossed the WMD threshold were religious cults (Aum 
Shinrikyo and the Rajneeshes), as each seemed unconstrained by earthly 
considerations. In truth, however, their uses of CBRN weapons were for 
very local, practical objectives, rather than in the service of a higher 
power. While the Rajneeshes were attempting to influence a local elec-
tion, the attack by Aum Shinrikyo against the Tokyo subway was intended 
to distract authorities and delay an ongoing investigation into activities of 
the group's leader Shoko Asahara.
Asal and Rethemeyer also found that in addition to religious groups, 
ethno-nationalists have a strong "othering" component in their 
ideologies, noting that groups in this category "can be just as 
indiscriminately violent as organizations motivated by religious fervor."20 
This raises the question whether ethno-nationalists may have a stronger 
inclination for CBRN weapons than other groups. Indeed, as noted 
earlier, at least two groups implicated in WMD attacks or plots in recent 
years were ethno-nationalist in ideological orientation. If the perceived 
enemies of a terrorist group (like Sinhalese or Russians) are separated by 
physical geography from the aggrieved population represented by the 
terrorist group (like Tamils or Chechens), perhaps there are fewer 
strategic constraints when considering a catastrophic terror attack against 
the governing regime (in Sri Lanka or Russia) and those who support it. 
This line of reasoning suggests that Chechens may someday consider 
deploying a CBRN weapon against Moscow or some other densely 
populated city in Russia, if they felt that doing so would force the 
government to acquiesce to Chechen demands for an independent 
homeland. However, as noted earlier, it is also likely that any attack of 
this type would result in a massive use of force against Chechens, thus a 
WMD attack would prove counterproductive.
From an analytical perspective, a key question is whether "othering" pro-
vides a uniquely salient justification for certain groups—like religious and 
ethno-national—to have more interest in CBRN weapons. In theory, this 
dimension of "othering" might also help explain the motivations behind 
James Cummings' ill-fated attempt to build a dirty bomb and detonate it 
in Washington, D.C.21 In this case, Cummings' hatred of an "other" eth-
nicity, fueled by racial insecurities, compelled him to pursue a CBRN 
weapon, although it is clear that using high explosives could have 
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achieved the same intended results. Overall, however, we have not seen 
enough of a significant prevalence of WMD interests among religious, 
ethno-nationalist or any category of terrorist group to indicate a signifi-
cant link between "othering" and decision-making with regard to WMD.
Finally, as with the practical constraint theories, the application of strate-
gic constraint theories to our threat analyses must differ according to the 
attributes of each specific type of weapon. For instance, some weapons—
like a small-scale chemical or radiological bomb—would be dramatic but 
would likely yield few casualties and would impact a relatively small, con-
tained geographic area. In contrast, a contagious pathogen used in a biot-
error attack could lead to a wide variety of scenarios, some of which 
include massive casualties and a potentially regional or even global 
impact. The political ideologies of most terrorist groups would suggest 
that the former, rather than the latter, is a more likely kind of CBRN 
weapon to anticipate at some point in our future. Meanwhile, some 
observers have suggested that the most devastating kinds of WMD attack 
would likely be carried out by an apocalyptic cult, whose strategic objec-
tives require the death of as many people as possible. Overall, the impor-
tant point to make here is that we should not consider strategic 
constraints to be universal across the entire CBRN spectrum.
In summary, the collection of strategic constraint theories indicates that a 
terrorist group is more likely to believe that its goals and objectives can be 
achieved through the use of conventional explosives and other kinds of 
non-WMD attacks—the perceived 'value added' of a WMD is viewed as 
just not worth the investment of time, effort, or risks. From this perspec-
tive, it stands to reason that governments can influence a terrorist group's 
strategic deliberations about CBRN weapons in ways that can enhance 
global security, as described below.
Implications for Research and Policy on 
WMD Terrorism
The application of the theories described above requires a case-by-case 
analysis of each terrorist group. For some groups, the strategic con-
straints for CBRN weapons are low—this includes al-Qaida, which has 
publicly declared an interest in acquiring and using CBRN weapons. 
However, the available information indicates that practical constraints 
remain a significant obstacle to overcome for virtually all terrorist groups. 
Some groups may have significant technical and global capabilities, but 
thus far have not expressed an interest in CBRN weapons, suggesting that 
perhaps strategic constraints have kept them from crossing the WMD 
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threshold. Analyzing these together reveals a collection of logical reasons 
for why most terrorist groups have not crossed the WMD threshold. Fur-
thermore, when looking at the available information and attributes of the 
terrorist groups that are of most concern to the National Counterterror-
ism Center (NCTC)—many of which are on the U.S. Department of State's 
list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations—we find that a majority of groups 
are clustered in the "high practical constraints/high strategic constraints" 
quadrant of Figure 2. Accordingly, there are very few groups in either the 
"low practical constraints" (e.g., a well-funded and equipped group like 
Hizballah) or "low strategic constraints" (e.g., apocalyptic cults). The 
most concerning kinds of groups, in terms of WMD threat analysis, are 
those that we would place in the "low strategic constraints/low practical 
constraints" quadrant. Fortunately, as noted earlier, available informa-
tion suggests there are no current terrorist groups with comparatively low 
practical and strategic constraints with regard to WMD.
Figure 2: A combination of factors influence a group's decision-
making, and places most terrorist groups in the High Strategic 
Constraints/High Practical Constraints category
Source: Author
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Of course, Figure 2 reflects only a brief snapshot based on current infor-
mation about those terrorist groups, while proper threat analysis must 
take into account a temporal dimension as well, as national security 
threats change and evolve over time. Thus, to deepen our understanding 
of how to project the future WMD terrorist threat, there are a variety of 
questions to consider for both research and policy. For example, how and 
why could these constraining factors diminish for a particular group? In 
other words, under what conditions might a group change from the 
upper-right quadrant to the lower-left quadrant (see Figure 3), indicating 
an increased likelihood of that group pursuing and using a CBRN 
weapon? In essence, a reduction in practical and/or strategic constraints 
is assumed to have some kind of impact on a group's deliberations about 
WMD.
Figure 3: Hypothetically, diminished Practical and/or Strategic Con-
straints could lead to an increased WMD threat from a particular terror-
ist group
Source: Author
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Some things that might impact practical constraints include regular 
scientific breakthroughs, potentially reducing the technological 
challenges of CBRN weapons. Are we making WMD easier to develop? 
Similarly, what is the impact of the global increase in biotechnology labs, 
or in the industrial uses of radioisotopes and new kinds of chemicals? Are 
we making potential WMD materials easier to acquire? A constant worry 
is that a terrorist group with a resonating ideology could succeed in 
recruiting sophisticated experts in biotechnology, chemistry, or other 
sciences—similar to Aum Shinrikyo's actions during the 1990s. Guarding 
against radicalization among members of the scientific community should 
be a critical dimension of any counterterrorism strategy. Also, as noted 
earlier in this discussion, the intersecting relationships of global criminal 
networks and terrorism could lead to a more facilitating environment for 
a WMD terrorist attack.
Over the past decade, the international community has focused consider-
able resources on exacerbating practical constraints, making it harder for 
terrorist groups to acquire CBRN materials and technologies. Combating 
the proliferation of nuclear materials and technologies—through intelli-
gence, interdiction and international cooperation—has been a particularly 
prominent goal of the Obama administration's foreign policy agenda. As 
Graham Allison has poignantly observed, the premise of these efforts is 
that if there are no nuclear materials, there can be no nuclear terrorism.22 
Of course, as noted earlier, there are rudimentary low-impact chemical 
weapons that can be fashioned out of ordinary household items, however, 
much has been done to constrain access to the kind of big-impact CBRN 
weapons featured in the more prominent public debates and Hollywood 
movies.
An underlying question at this point is, would decreased barriers to 
acquire or build a CBRN weapons lead to stronger interest or increased 
efforts to do so? In other words, if CBRN weapons (or materials to make 
them) were easier to make or obtain, would more groups have and use 
them? Or would strategic constraints supersede here, meaning that the 
group would still not pursue WMD even if these weapons became easier 
to acquire or develop, because of limited perceived benefit, and potential 
counterproductive impact? Perhaps most importantly, why (and in what 
ways) might we see a group change its views toward CBRN weapons in the 
future?
Projecting the impact of changes in strategic constraints is obviously 
more complicated. There are many foreseeable events or situations in 
which a terrorist group may feel less constrained by the strategic and 
ideological considerations described above. For instance, if a terrorist 
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group's primary state sponsor were the target of a WMD attack, would 
that terrorist group then use WMD in a retribution-style attack? 
Similarly, if a government used CBRN weapons against a group (or its 
constituents), would the targeted group feel compelled to respond in kind, 
regardless of the costs? In other words, if Iran were to use chemical 
munitions against the People's Mujahedin of Iran (MeK) or Jundullah, or 
Syria deployed chemical weapons against rebels (like Saddam Hussein's 
attacks against Kurdish villages during the 1980s), would it mobilize 
thousands of sympathizers to embrace terrorism, including some who 
commit themselves to acquiring and using WMD against Syrian 
government forces or civilian targets? Would a group turn to a CBRN 
weapon in an act of desperation or last resort? For example, would a sense 
of growing irrelevance and a need to recapture center stage (or risk losing 
influence forever) drive a member or affiliate group of al-Qaida to cross 
the WMD threshold?
These and other questions address an important—and often under-
appreciated—issue about changes in the strategic calculations a group 
would make about WMD terrorism. Under what conditions could CBRN 
weapons become widely supported by a group's constituencies? If a 
government comes to power in a democracy but is seen as weak, could 
this offer a new strategic benefit to a terrorist group that demonstrates a 
capability to deploy CBRN weapons, threatens to use such weapons, and 
then forces a negotiated settlement to whatever conflict animates their 
violence? What about peer pressure—if a group (particularly one 
considered a peer competitor) crosses the WMD threshold, would it 
incentivize others to follow (an adaptation of Mia Bloom's "outbidding" 
thesis with regard to suicide bombings)?23 One group's ability to develop 
and use CBRN weapons may not change the inherent nature of WMD 
terrorism—particularly the risks, financing and level of technical 
sophistication necessary—but this could forge a path that other groups 
would eventually follow.
While research is still needed on the ways in which situations and events 
could elevate the threat of WMD terrorism, we must also focus our efforts 
on understanding what the international community can do to exacerbate 
the practical and strategic constraints in ways that can lower the chances 
of a WMD terror attack in the future. Hence, are we making the environ-
ment harder for the terrorists now than it has been before? Beyond the 
realm of practical constraints, are we influencing the strategic delibera-
tions of terrorist groups and can we do so more effectively? For example, 
surely Hezbollah's leaders know without a doubt that openly declaring an 
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interest in CBRN weapons, or even the mere possession of precursor 
materials for such weapons, would likely bring considerable negative 
attention from neighboring countries in the Middle East, especially Israel.
One assumption that is made in this policy arena is that a posture of cer-
tain and forceful retaliation can be a way of convincing a group that a 
WMD would most definitely not be in their best self-interests. For exam-
ple, as noted earlier, Chechen groups may be constrained from using 
CBRN weapons in attacks against Moscow because of the likelihood that 
such attacks would produce heavy-handed Russian military reprisals. 
When studying the history of terrorism, we find that groups and their 
leaders have been influenced by a core instinct for survival; there are very 
few instances where a terrorist group intentionally set out to do some-
thing knowing that their success in the operation would lead directly to 
their own demise. Furthermore, the more established the terrorist group 
is, and the more entrenched its leaders are, the more the group has to 
lose. This aspect, in turn, also influences caution in their strategic deliber-
ations about the usefulness of CBRN weapons.
One obvious comparison here is in the case of the 9/11 attacks in New 
York and Washington, D.C. While CBRN weapons were not involved, the 
effects of those attacks are considered by many to be equal in scale of 
death and destruction to what we envision from a WMD terrorist attack. A 
significant body of research has emerged since those attacks, which sug-
gests that the leaders of al-Qaida made several strategic miscalculations. 
For example, Max Abrahms and Karolina Lula offer compelling empirical 
and theoretical evidence that Usama bin Ladin "overestimated the likeli-
hood that 9/11 would coerce American concessions."24 Instead, the ter-
rorist network lost its safe haven in Afghanistan, its Taliban allies were 
driven from power, and many senior leaders of both al-Qaida and the Tal-
iban have been killed or captured. One could easily make the argument 
that the situation and future prognosis for both al-Qaida and the Taliban 
would be much different had the 9/11 attacks not occurred. This should 
prove instructive for terrorist groups considering whether a CBRN attack 
would be of sufficient strategic benefit.
Finally, governments must be prudent and responsible with regard to pre-
paring their citizens to deal effectively with a WMD terrorist attack. If 
such an attack produces mass panic, draconian security measures or other 
forms of over-reaction from the government, this could support the ideo-
logical narrative of the terrorist group, thus incentivizing future WMD 
terrorist attacks. If we accept the premise that there are some things that 
could increase the WMD terror threat in the future, what are we doing 
now to prepare an appropriate response?
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In summary, there are many research questions that can enhance our 
analysis of the future WMD threat. The underlying focus of this research 
should be to gain a clear understanding of what could increase (or dimin-
ish) the practical and/or strategic constraints that terrorist groups face 
regarding CBRN weapons. That understanding, in turn, should guide pol-
icies and strategies for combating the threat of WMD terrorism. By com-
bining theories and empirical evidence, we can provide a more accurate 
portrayal of this threat and how to respond most effectively.
Conclusion
This analysis indicates there is a need for new research that incorporates 
empirical evidence and new theories on how events and contextual situa-
tions can impact a terrorist group's deliberations about WMD. For exam-
ple, what data or evidence is available that can tell us how one WMD 
attack might impact the strategic calculations and deliberations of other 
groups in the future? Hence, projecting the future WMD threat must con-
sider whether the theories of practical and strategic constraints described 
here will hold constant or change according to events and situational con-
ditions. Only then can we find an appropriate balance between underesti-
mating the threat and promoting mass hysteria. Meanwhile, the objective 
of governments, and the international community in general, should be to 
increase all kinds of constraints, eventually making the practical and stra-
tegic challenges insurmountable for any terrorist group to cross the WMD 
threshold in the future.
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